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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RACIAL DISCRIMINATION- THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT-42 U.S.C. § 1982-The United States Supreme
Court has held that the official closing of a public street, result-
ing in a benefit for the white residents of that street and an in-
convenience disparately impacting black residents of a neighbor-
ing community, is neither a badge of slavery prohibited by the
thirteenth amendment nor an impairment of property interests
protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584 (1981).
In 1970, residents of Hein Park, a white residential community
in the city of Memphis, Tennessee, requested that the city close
four streets leading into the community1 to reduce the volume of
traffic through it. The city refused after various municipal de-
partments objected to the proposed street closings.2 The city's
Traffic Engineering Department, however, noted that traffic
through the community could be reduced substantially by closing
West Drive, a two-lane street which passes in a north-south
direction through the center of Hein Park at its northern end.3
Subsequently, on July 9, 1973, members of the Hein Park Civic
Association filed an application to close West Drive near its
northern terminus, the intersection of Jackson Avenue and
Springdale Street.4 Their purpose was to decrease the amount of
through-traffic using Hein Park streets, enhance the safety of
children who live in and walk to school through Hein Park, and
minimize the effects of traffic pollution in the residential com-
munity.5 The proposed closing aroused substantial opposition in a
1. City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1588 (1981).
2. Id The Memphis Police, Fire, and Sanitation Departments objected to
the closings. Id
3. Id. at 1587-88.
4. Id. at 1588. The application was filed with the Memphis and Shelby
County Planning Association, which would receive the views of interested and
affected municipal departments and submit a recommendation to the Memphis
City Council. Id.
5. Id Jackson Avenue and Springdale Street are two four-lane streets
which are heavily travelled by residents of the predominantly black community
to the north of Hein Park. Before the closing of West Drive, a significant
amount of the southbound traffic on Springdale Street, the majority of which
traffic was black, would continue south into Hein Park on West Drive. Then,
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black community north of Hein Park.' After the City Council of
Memphis held a hearing at which both the proponents and op-
ponents of the proposal were given an opportunity to be heard,
it adopted a resolution conditionally authorizing the closing of
West Drive.'
On April 1, 1974, three individuals and two civic associations,
suing on behalf of a class of residents of the community north of
the Hein Park subdivision, filed a complaint against the city of
Memphis and various city officials in the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee.' The complaint alleged
that the closing was an unconstitutional infringement of the
plaintiffs' rights under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution,' and prayed that the city' of
Memphis be enjoined from closing West Drive. The complaint
due to the location of a municipal park to the south of the Hein Park community,
it would turn either east or west to the next through street before continuing
south again to the center of the city of Memphis. The closing of West Drive
would require this traffic to turn east or west before it even entered Hein
Park. Id.
6. Id. at 1589 & n.6. Opponents of the closing submitted written objections
to the City Council containing approximately 1,000 signatures. Id. at 1589 n.5.
7. Id at 1588. The conditions included in the City Council's resolution
authorizing the closing were the same conditions recommended by the County
Planning Commission in its recommendation to approve the application. The
conditions were that the residents of West Drive provide an easement for pre-
sent and future utility company facilities or the money to relocate present
facilities, and that a clearance be provided for fire department vehicles. I&4
8. Id at 1589.
9. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub-
ject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, in relevant part,
provides:
Section 1. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Id. It is well established that the thirteenth amendment and its enabling
legislation apply both to state and private action, whereas the fourteenth
amendment and its legislation apply only to state action. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883). See also text accompanying note 72 infra.
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was dismissed by the district court on the grounds that it failed
to allege any injury to the plaintiffs' property or any dispropor-
tionate racial impact, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing as
affected property owners to raise procedural objections to the
city's action.' ° The decision was reversed and remanded by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which con-
cluded that the complaint, fairly construed, alleged that the city
of Memphis had granted to white residents the benefits of
privacy and tranquility associated with an exclusive dead end
street without granting the same benefit to similarly situated
black residents.'" Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that if
the plaintiffs could prove that Memphis city officials granted the
benefit of a closed street to the residents of Hein Park because
of their race, they would have a valid claim under section 1982 of
the Civil Rights Act. 2 Additionally, the court of appeals held
that in the absence of flagrantly discriminatory treatment which
would inherently violate equal protection or compel an inference
of discriminatory purpose, the plaintiffs would have to prove
racially discriminatory motivation, intent, or purpose."
On remand, the district court found in favor of the defendants
on all three contested issues of fact 4 and entered judgment ac-
cordingly. Again on appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
while not specifically rejecting any of the lower court's factual
findings, held that the district court erred in focusing primarily
on the issue of whether the defendants had granted the benefit
of a street closing to whites while denying similar benefits to
10. 101 S. Ct. at 1589 & n.8.
11. Greene v. City of Memphis, 535 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir. 1976).
12. Id at 979. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), in relevant part provides: "All
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Terr-
itory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
13. 535 F.2d at 979.
14. 101 S. Ct. at 1590. On remand, a pretrial order identified three con-
tested issues of fact: (1) whether the defendants' closure of West Drive granted
benefits to white residents of that street which were denied on racial grounds
to similarly situated black neighborhoods; (2) whether a discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor in the decision to close West Drive; (3) whether the
defendants followed the normal procedures in processing the application to
close West Drive, and, if not, to what extent they failed to comply. Id. The trial
court did acknowledge that the street closing would disproportionately impact
upon some black residents while benefitting white residents of Hein Park. Id. at
1591.
1981
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blacks."5 The court of appeals further held that it was un-
necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that the city of Memphis
had denied street closing applications submitted by blacks in
order to show a violation of section 1982; 6 they could demon-
strate that the closing of West Drive constituted a "badge of
slavery" under the thirteenth amendment, 7 and thus violated
section 1982, without proving unequal treatment. 8 The court of
appeals concluded that relief under section 1982 was required be-
cause the closing of West Drive would benefit a white neigh-
borhood and detrimentally affect a predominantly black neigh-
borhood; the erection of the barrier precisely at the point
separating these neighborhoods would have the effect of limiting
contact between them; the closing was a unique effort to protect
one neighborhood from an external influence which the residents
perceived as undesirable; and there was evidence that property
values might decline in the predominantly black neighborhood to
the north of Hein Park. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
whether a violation of section 1982 could be established without
proof of discriminatory intent.2" The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Stevens," held that the street closing did not violate the
rights granted to black residents of the community north of Hein
Park under section 1982 or the thirteenth amendment.' Before
addressing the legal issues, the Court considered whether the
court of appeals' conclusion that the closing of West Drive would
benefit a white neighborhood and detrimentally affect a predom-
inantly black neighborhood was supported by the record and the
district court's findings.' Justice Stevens recognized that the
conclusion of the court of appeals was based on the district
15. Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 400-01 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 100 (1981).
16. Id at 400-02.
17. Id at 400-04. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
18. 610 F.2d at 403.
19. Id at 404.
20. 446 U.S. 934 (1980).
21. City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584 (1981). Justice Stevens was
joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice White filed a concurring opinion. Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented.
22. Id at 1598, 1601.
23. Id. at 1591.
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court's express finding that the city's action would dis-
proportionately impact some black citizens, while causing the
white residents of West Drive less inconvenience." The Court
acknowledged that there would be some incorivenience to the
black citizens living north of Hein Park, but concluded that the
inconvenience would be minimal- because southbound motorists
would merely have to make the inevitable left or right turn one-
half mile sooner than they would if West Drive were open.25
The Court rejected the conclusion of the court of appeals that
the street closing would erect a barrier at the point separating
the black and white neighborhoods and limit contact between
them. The majority asserted that the court of appeals placed more
significance on the closing of West Drive as a barrier than the
record warranted.26 The Court noted that there were other
streets passing through Hein Park which would still be open to
vehicular traffic.' Consequently, the Court concluded that the
diversion of traffic around the West Drive residential area did
not support the conclusion that contact between the neighboring
black and white communities would be limited.28
The third conclusion of the court of appeals, that the street
closing was sought to protect the neighborhood from external in-
fluences perceived as "undesirable" by its residents, was inter-
preted by the Court to suggest that the court below viewed the
racial attitude of Hein Park residents as the motivating factor
behind the closing of West Drive.' The majority rejected that
view as unsupported by the district court's findings, noting that
the trial judge had found that public welfare and safety factors,
rather than racial factors, motivated the effort to limit excessive
24. Id
25. Id. at 1591 & n.18. The Court did acknowledge that the trip from
Springdale Street to Overton Park, the municipal park immediately to the
south of Hein Park, "will be slightly longer with West Drive closed, but it will
not be significantly less convenient." Id at 1592.
26. Id. The Court cited to testimony in the trial court which noted the
northernmost portion of West Drive would be deeded to the property owners
abutting West Drive and Jackson Avenue, and acknowledged that it would give
them the absolute right to bar all pedestrian traffic on that portion of West
Drive. The Court noted, however, that the record was unclear about whether
the property owners would, in fact, do so. Id at 1591-92 n.21.
27. Id at 1592.
28. Id
29. Id at 1593.
1981
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traffic on West Drive. 0 The majority cited to transcripts of the
Memphis City Council hearings as further evidence that the
residents of West Drive considered through-traffic to be un-
desirable because of the speed and number of vehicles travelling
on the street and not because of the race of the drivers.3 The
Court thus concluded that when viewed in such a context, the
"undesirable" nature of the traffic strengthened, rather than
weakened, the justification for the closure decision and foreclosed
any finding of discriminatory intent.3 '
The Court also decided, based on the speculative evidence in
the record, that the court of appeals was unjustified in con-
cluding that the closing of West Drive would cause a decline in
the property values in the predominantly black neighborhood to
the north of Hein Park. 3
Summarizing its factual findings, the Court concluded that the
record established that the city's decision to close West Drive
was motivated not by racial considerations, but by the interests
of neighborhood safety and tranquility; that the city gave a
benefit to white property owners but there was no basis to infer
that it would deny a similar benefit to black property owners;
and that the street closing did not have an adverse impact on the
value of black-owned property, but only created some minor in-
convenience for black motorists. 4
The Court next examined the protective and remedial reach of
section 1982 to see if it encompassed the property interests
asserted by the plaintiffs. The Court acknowledged that it had
broadly construed the language of section 1982 to protect not only
30. Id. The Court noted that: "[The trial judge] expressly discounted the
racial composition of the traffic on West Drive in evaluating its undesirable
character; he noted that 'excessive traffic in any residential neighborhood has
public welfare factors such as safety, noise and litter, regardless of the race of
the traffic and the neighborhood.' " Id.
31. Id.
32. Id at 1594.
33. Id. at 1595. The Court noted that the only expert testimony on that
issue was provided by a real estate agent called by the plaintiffs. He established
that such a decline in property values would not result from the closure itself,
and further speculated that the street closing may have an adverse
psychological effect on black citizens living north of Hein Park, causing them to
be less attentive to the upkeep of their own property, thus resulting in a
decline in property values in the future. Id See note 68 infra.
34. 101 S. Ct. at 1596.
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the enforceability of the property interests acquired by black
citizens, but also the right of those citizens to obtain and use
property on an equal basis with white citizens. 5 Thus, the Court
reasoned that in applying section 1982 to this case, the analysis
must focus on the relationship between the closing of West Drive
and the impairment, if any, of the respondents' property in-
terests or of their rights to hold and acquire property on an
equal basis with white citizens."
The majority concluded that section 1982 would support a
challenge to official action which conferred a benefit on white
property owners while refusing the same or similar benefits to
similarly situated black property owners, which reduced the
value of property owned by blacks, or which severely restricted
access to black homes. 7 However, the Court found the city of
Memphis had not acted in such a manner and that the plaintiffs
had not suffered any impairment of property interests protected
by section 1982.1
The Court then addressed whether the plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights under the thirteenth amendment had been violated
35. Id To illustrate its prior broad construction of section 1982, the Court
made reference to the types of property interests accorded protection by that
provision under the decisions in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In those cases, the protection of section 1982 was ex-
tended to the right of black citizens not to have their property interests im-
paired or burdened because of race. In Jones, the Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 1982 prohibits all racial discrimination, whether governmental or private,
in the sale or rental of property. 329 U.S. at 438-39. See text accompanying note
75 infra. In Hurd, the Supreme Court ruled that private covenants, imposing
racial restrictions on the sale of property, were unenforceable even though
there had been no other impairment of the legal rights of blacks to buy or sell
other property. 334 U.S. at 34. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that section
1982 prohibited the denial of an assignable membership share in recreational
facilities to black lessees of property that had been granted to white lessees of
that same property. 396 U.S. at 237. See text accompanying notes 79 & 82 infra.
36. 101 S. Ct. at 1598.
37. Id
38. Id Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, said:
The injury to respondents established by the record is the requirement
that one public street rather than another must be used for certain trips
within the city. We need not assess the magnitude of that injury to con-
clude that it does not involve any impairment to the kind of property in-
terests that we have identified as being within the reach of § 1982.
1981
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by the closing of West Drive. In addressing the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that the closing was an unconstitutional "badge of slavery"
because it conferred a benefit upon white property owners while
burdening black property owners, the Court looked to Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 9 as the enunciation of the extent to which
the thirteenth amendment's protection could be invoked by Con-
gress under that amendment's enabling clause."0 The Court noted
that although the Jones Court decided that Congress, pursuant
to the enabling clause, had the power to do much more than
merely abolish slavery, the question of whether section 1 of the
thirteenth amendment 4' alone did anything.more than what was
left open.42 The Greene Court also left the question open because
the city's justifications for closing West Drive showed that the
inconvenience it caused a number of black citizens could not in
fairness be labelled a badge or incident of slavery, despite the
disparate impact of that inconvenience on black citizens.4 The
majority found no racially discriminatory purpose motivating the
Memphis City Council, but rather found that legitimate local in-
terests motivated the closing of West Drive." Finding no basis
for concluding that the interests asserted by the city of Memphis
were a pretext for racial discrimination, the Court held that the
closing of West Drive represented a routine burden of citizen-
ship, albeit a burden that rested disproportionately upon black
citizens,45 and was not a violation of the thirteenth amendment.
39. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See note 35 supra.
40. 100 S. Ct. at 1599.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Jones Court noted that whether the thirteenth amendment
itself did any more than abolish slavery was "a question not involved in this
case." 392 U.S. at 439.
43. 101 S. Ct. at 1599.
44. Id. The majority believed that the proper management of the flow of
vehicular traffic within a city was one of the interests motivating the Memphis
City Council, and was a local policy decision which deserved deference. Id. at
1599-600. The Court recognized the wide discretion local government must be
allowed in taking action to protect its legitimate interests, and in accom-
modating the conflicting interests affected by that action. Id at 1600. See, e.g.,
County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (per curiam);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
45. 101 S. Ct. at 1599-1601. The Court recognized that closing West Drive
would weigh more heavily upon blacks, but concluded that "a review of the
justification for the official action challenged in this case demonstrates that its
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In a concurring opinion, Justice White criticized both the
majority and the dissent for straying beyond the question for
which the petition for a writ of certiorari sought review:
Whether proof of discriminatory intent or purpose was
necessary in order to establish a violation of section 1982.48 After
reviewing the legislative history and purpose of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866," from which section 1982 was derived, Justice
White stressed that Congress intended the Civil Rights Act to
prohibit purposeful discrimination against newly freed black
slaves, and was not concerned with racially neutral laws which
may have an incidental adverse effect on blacks. 8 He further
maintained that because intentional discrimination was the prob-
lem Congress intended to address with the Civil Rights Act of
1866, that should be the basis for determining the reach and
scope of section 1982."9 Justice White thus concluded that a viola-
tion of section 1982 requires some showing of a racially discrim-
inatory intent. 0
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent,5 focused primarily on
the symbolic significance that the closing of West Drive would
have. " Accepting the conclusions of the court of appeals,' the
dissent asserted that the closing of West Drive constituted the
type of harm that was prohibited by section 1982.1"
After disagreeing with the majority's treatment of the case as
merely a racially neutral decision to close a street,55 Justice
disparate impact on black citizens could not ... be fairly characterized as a
badge or incident of slavery." Id at 1599.
46. Id at 1601-02 (White, J., concurring).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)). See note 74 infra.
48. 101 S. Ct. at 1602-04 (White, J., concurring).
49. Id at 1604 (White, J., concurring).
50. Id
51. Id at 1604 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Blackmun
joined in the dissent.
52. Id at 1605-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
54. 101 S. Ct. at 1611 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's view,
the closing of West Drive, in substance and effect, would carve out a racial
enclave. It was his conclusion that "the carving out of racial enclaves within a
city is precisely the kind of injury that the statute [section 19821 was enacted to
prevent." Id Even though Justice Marshall found clear evidence of racially
discriminatory motivation, he did not believe that such evidence was necessary
to prove a violation of section 1982. Id at 1608 n.ll (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 1605 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1981
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Marshall stated specifically his differences with the majority's
conclusions. In addressing the majority's conclusion that the
adverse impact on blacks would be limited to an inconvenience to
black motorists, Justice Marshall maintained that the majority
ignored the symbolic, racially discriminatory message of this in-
convenience." He asserted that this message has a much more
significant adverse impact than the majority believed because of
its unfavorable psychological effects upon residents of the
neighboring black community.57
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's character-
ization of the barrier to be erected at the point of contact between
the black and white neighborhoods as merely a curb.58 The true
significance of the barrier, as Justice Marshall viewed it, rested
in the deeding of the northermost portion of West Drive to the
private property owners abutting West Drive and Jackson Ave-
nue, thus enabling them to exclude both pedestrian and vehi-
cular traffic. 9 Additionally, Justice Marshall noted that expert,
testimony in the trial court predicted that the street closing
would be likely to have a significant psychological effect on
blacks living north of Hein Park.0 He cited testimony of affected
black residents and of a real estate agent familiar with the area
in support of that prediction." In view of the facts and testi-
56. Id. at 1605-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's view, based
on the trial court testimony of two members of the respondent class (N.T.
Greene and Eleanore Cross) and the trial judge's own comments, the symbolic
message is that black people living north of Hein Park are being told to stay
out of the all-white subdivision. Id. at 1606 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id See also text accompanying notes 60 & 61 infra.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 1606 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See id. at 1592 & n.19. The
majority stated: "The physical barrier is a curb that will not impede the
passage of municipal vehicles." Id. at 1592.
59. Id. at 1606 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent observed: "The city is
creating the barrier across West Drive by deeding public property to private
landowners. Nothing will prevent the residents of Hein Park from excluding
'undesirable' pedestrians as well as vehicular traffic if they so choose." Id See
also text accompanying note 26 supra.
60. 101 S. Ct. at 1606 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited to
the trial court testimony of Dr. Marvin Feit, a professor of psychiatry at the
University of Tennessee, who testified that the closing of West Drive "will rein-
force feelings about the city's 'favoritism' toward whites and will 'serve as a
monument to racial hostility.'" Id
61. Id. at 1606 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that
one black resident testified that he would see the street closing as a continua-
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mony, Justice Marshall concluded that he could not minimize the
barrier's significance in determining the harm that would be suf-
fered by the plaintiffs."
Justice Marshall, citing the trial court testimony of a West
Drive resident who opposed the closing,83 differed with the
majority's interpretation of the term "undesirable traffic"64 and
its assertion that neither Memphis city officials nor Hein Park
residents were racially motivated in the decision to close the
street." In further support of his position, Justice Marshall
observed that the testimony of Memphis city officials strongly
suggested that usual procedures were not followed in the deci-
sion to close West Drive.6 He noted that it was indisputable that
all affected parties knew that the street closing would have dis-
parate racial impact, and concluded that the facts revealed in the
record represent the kind of evidence that is relevant to an in-
quiry into racial motivation. 7
tion of the insult and humiliation of blacks, and another black resident testified
that the closing would "put a fear" on her. The real estate agent's testimony in-
dicated that he would expect similar effects. Id
62. Id at 1607 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id See id. at 1594 n.26.
64. Id at 1607 & n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The majority apparently reads the term "undesirable" as referring to the
prospect of having any traffic at all on West Drive. But the common sense
understanding of [one West Drive resident's] testimony must be that the
word "undesirable" was meant to describe the traffic that was actually using
the street, as opposed to any traffic that might use it. Of course, the traf-
fic that was both actually using the street and would be affected by the
barrier was predominantly Negro.
Id at 1607 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
65. Id Justice Marshall argued that "[a] proper reading of the record
demonstrates . !.. that respondents produced at trial precisely the kind of
evidence of intent that we deemed probative in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.. See text accompanying note 107
infra.
66. 101 S. Ct. at 1608 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Specific examples of devia-
tions from normal procedure noted by Justice Marshall included the city's per-
mitting the street closing application to go through without the signature or
consent of [one resident], despite a requirement that such applications be signed
by all residents of the affected street; the city's failure to give notice to black
citizens living north of Hein Park that an application to close West Drive was
under consideration; the Planning Commission's refusal to allow these citizens
to participate in its hearings on the application or to examine the relevant files;
and City Council's granting of only 15 minutes for opponents of the closing to
state their case. Id
67. Id Justice Marshall further noted that "[r]egardless of whether this
1981
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Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that black property owners north of Hein Park would not suffer
economic harm as a result of the street closing. Justice Marshall
cited the trial court testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses
to support his contention that the closing of West Drive would
indeed have an adverse effect on property values in the black
neighborhood north of Hein Park.' In Justice Marshall's view,
the combined testimony of the plaintiffs' two expert witnesses
sufficiently demonstrated that the closing of West Drive would
harm the property interests of the black residents of that
neighborhood. 9
The United States Supreme Court in City of Memphis v. Greene
once again faced issues arising out of the thirteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution0 and the post-Civil War
legislation authorized by it." The proposition that the thirteenth
amendment not only outlawed slavery but also empowered Con-
gress to enact legislation to abolish the "badges and incidents" of
slavery was first advanced by Justice Harlan in his dissent in the
Civil Rights Cases,2 decided in the post-Civil War era. Although
evidence is viewed as conclusive, it can hardly be stated with accuracy that 'no
evidence' exists." Id at 1608 & n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 1609-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent was referring to
the testimony of H.C. Moore, a real estate agent with 17 years experience, who
testified that the street closing would have a depressing effect on the black
citizens north of Hein Park, resulting in less upkeep of their property which
would lead to an adverse effect on the value of the property. Id at 1609 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). He also referred to the testimony of Dr. Marvin Feit, who
testified, based on his experience as Allegheny County, Pa., Director of Plan-
ning, that the change in traffic patterns resulting from the street closing would
lower the property values in the black neighborhood. Id at 1609-10 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
69. Id at 1610 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
71. See note 47 supra.
72. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Justice Harlan's dissent argued:.
[T]here are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery
and servitude, and that the power to enforce by appropriate legislation
the Thirteenth Amendment may be exerted by legislation of a direct and
primary character, for the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of
its badges and incidents, are propositions which ought to be deemed in-
disputable.
Id at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Civil Rights Cases involved five separate
criminal trials in each of which the defendants were charged with violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation and amusement. The majority opinion declared sections 1
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the majority in that case recognized this power, it ruled that
discrimination based on race did not constitute a badge of
slavery within the meaning of the thirteenth amendment. 3 After
this decision, the thirteenth amendment and section 1982 in its
various codifications74 lay dormant for nearly a century.
The thirteenth amendment and its enabling legislation were
revived in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."5 Jones, a section 1982
action, was the beginning of the Court's trend of broadly con-
struing section 1982 as well as the enabling clause, section 2 of
the thirteenth amendment. The Jones Court relied on the
legislative and judicial history," as well as the language of sec-
tion 1982, as proof that the statute was intended to prohibit
private as well as public acts of discrimination. The Court con-
cluded that the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment
gave Congress the power not only to outlaw the institution of
slavery itself, but also to determine what constitutes the badges
and incidents of slavery and to pass appropriate legislation to
and 2 of the Act to be unconstitutional as applied to the States, and not
authorized by either the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. Id. at 25.
73. Id. at 24. The majority stated:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to
the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will . . . deal with in
other matters of intercourse or business.
Id. at 24-25.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) was originally part of section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), re-enacted by section 18 of the En-
forcement Act of 1870, ch. 144, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 & 1982 (1976)).
75. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones, the petitioners alleged that respondent
Alfred H. Mayer Company had refused to sell them a home in the community of
Paddock Woods in St. Louis County solely because they were black. The peti-
tioners sought injunctive and other relief under the provisions of section 1982.
Id at 412. See note 35 supra.
Also contributing to the revival of the thirteenth amendment enabling
legislation was Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which held that a
private, commercial, non-sectarian school's denial of admission to prospective
students on racial grounds violates section 1981. Id. at 172. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(1976) provides, in relevant part, that "[alll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State ... to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. .....
76. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of section 1982, see
Comment, Constitutional Law: Badges and Indices of Slavery Prohibited Under
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 17 Loy. L. REV. 79, 82-85 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Badges and Indices of Slavery]. See also 101 S. Ct. at 1612; 392 U.S. at 429-35.
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eradicate them." The Jones Court asserted that Congress, having
determined that public and private acts of racial discrimination
in the sale and rental of property were badges of slavery,
enacted section 1982 to eradicate them."8
The principle established in the Jones decision, that section
1982 extends the anti-slavery provisions of the thirteenth amend-
ment to prohibit racial discrimination in the outright sale or rental
of property, was subsequently expanded by the Supreme court
in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc."9 to include a ban on
racial discrimination in the use of community facilities associated
with the rental of property. The Court ruled that the member-
ship share in Little Hunting Park, Inc., which had been made
available to white residents of the area, was part of the lease,
and the respondent corporation's racially motivated refusal to ap-
prove Sullivan's assignment of that share to black petitioner
Freeman violated section 1982.0 The Sullivan Court extended
section 1982 to prohibit racial discrimination in the provision of
facilities or benefits incidental to or associated with the owner-
ship or rental of property, because such discrimination interferes
with a black person's right to lease or hold property on an equal
basis with white persons."'
77. 392 U.S. at 440.
78. Id at 440-44.
79. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In Sullivan, the petitioner was a white member of
respondent corporation, which operated recreational facilities for the benefit of
residents of an area in Fairfax County, Virginia. His membership share entitled
him to use these facilities, and the corporation's by-laws allowed him to assign
his share to his tenant, subject to approval by the Board of Directors. Peti-
tioner Sullivan leased his house to petitioner Freeman, a black, and assigned
his membership share to Freeman. The Board refused to approve the assign-
ment because Freeman was black. Id at 234-35.
80. Id at 236-37. The Court stated:
Freeman paid part of his . . . monthly rental for the assignment of the
membership share in Little Hunting Park. The transaction clearly fell
within the "lease." The right to "lease" is protected by § 1982 . . .
Respondents' actions in refusing to approve the assignment of the
membership share in this case was clearly an interference with Freeman's
right to "lease."
Id.
81. Id at 236. The Court observed that Little Hunting Park "is open to
every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective ele-
ment other than race .... " Id The Court, reasoning that the membership share
offered to white residents is part of their lease, see note 80 supra, concluded
that Little Hunting Park's discriminatory membership practices prevented
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The Court reinforced these principles in Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Association, Inc.,"2 a suit for damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1982. The Court
found that preferential treatment regarding membership appli-
cations in the Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association was given
to white residents of a preferred geographical area and denied to
black residents of the same area. This was analogous to the situa-
tion in Sullivan," and therefore Wheaton-Haven's discriminatory
membership policy violated section 1982.8
This line of decisions reaffirmed the reach of thirteenth
amendment prohibitions, through section 1982, into private as
well as public acts of discrimantion, and expanded its protection
to bar not only discrimination in the outright sale or rental of
property, but also the denial on racial grounds of ancillary
rights, benefits, and privileges associated with the ownership or
rental of property. This reaffirmation, however, seems to have
been halted by City of Memphis v. Greene. The majority in
Greene found no impairment of the property interests of black
citizens as a result of the closing of West Drive, 5 but concluded
that the closing was merely a slight inconvenience" to black
Freeman from leasing property on an equal basis with white citizens. 396 U.S.
at 237.
82. 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In Tillman, the respondent association keyed its
membership to a local geographical preference area, conferring upon residents
of that area certain preferential treatment regarding membership applications.
One of the petitioners, a black resident of the geographical preference area in-
quired about membership in the association and instead of being given the same
preferential treatment as other area residents, he was discouraged from apply-
ing because of his race. Id. at 433-34.
83. Id at 437. The Court analogized the preference given to residents of
the geographical preference area with the membership shares available in
Sullivan. Consequently, the Court found that "the purchase price [of a home,
paid by the plaintiff in Tillman], like the rental paid by Freeman in Sullivan,
may well reflect benefits dependent on residency in the preference area. For
[the plaintiffs in Tillman], however, the right to acquire a home in the area is
abridged and diluted." Id
84. Id
85. 101 S. Ct. at 1598.
86. Id at 1596. However, Justice Marshall suggested in his dissent that
there is a symbolic significance to this inconvenience. In discussing this sym-
bolic significance, Justice Marshall observed that:
Many places to which residents of the area north of HeinPark would
logically drive lie to the south of the subdivision. Until the closing of
West Drive, the most direct route for those who lived on or near Spring-
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motorists. The majority has thereby implied that an act that
weighs more heavily on blacks than on whites must entail a mea-
surable economic harm or loss, or a complete deprivation of a
right or privilege, before it is considered a badge or incident of
slavery subject to the sanctions of the thirteenth amendment
and its enabling legislation. 7
The closing of West Drive establishes the dangerous precedent
for residents of other streets in Hein Park, or of other white
neighborhoods in Memphis,"8 of allowing the same interests of
neighborhood tranquility and child safety to be asserted under
similar circumstances. This would perpetuate the process of
carving out racial enclaves, a process which Justice Stewart in
Jones warned was also a relic of slavery subject to the prohibi-
tions of section 1982 and the thirteenth amendment. 9 The Jones
dale St. was straight down West Drive. Now the Negro drivers are being
told in essence, "You must take the long way around because you don't
live in this 'protected' white neighborhood."
Id at 1605-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the city council resolution
which authorized the closing of West Drive also provided that the northernmost
portion of West Drive would be conveyed to the owners of the property abutting
that street and Jackson Avenue. The court of appeals found, and the Supreme
Court did not dispute, that this conveyance would give these property owners
the absolute right to bar all pedestrian traffic from West Drive if they so wished.
Id at 1592 n.21; 610 F.2d at 396. These factors can be said to have attached a
stigma to the ownership of property in the community north of Hein Park. But
see 101 S. Ct. at 1601 (White, J., concurring).
87. 101 S. Ct. at 1598. The Court stressed the importance of showing a
decline in the value of property owned by respondents or a denial of benefits or
privileges granted to similarly situated whites in proving a violation of section
1982, id., and stated that the thirteenth amendment would only prohibit acts
which "equated to an actual restraint on the liberty of black citizens . . .com-
parable to the odious practice the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to
eradicate." Id at 1600.
88. Id at 1594 n.25.
89. 392 U.S. at 442-43. In Jones, Justice Stewart stated:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free
exercise of [the rights of black citizens], were substitutes for the slave
system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a
substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men
into ghettoes and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of
their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
Id at 441-43.
The detrimental effect of racial segregation has been recognized by the
Court in another factual setting, in the landmark school desegregation case,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Chief Justice Warren, writing for
the Court in Brown, noted. "Segregation of white and colored children in public
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Court traced the history of discrimination in the United States,
from the institution of slavery itself to the segregated neigh-
borhoods still present today. Such discrimination and segregation
may not necessarily inflict economic harm on blacks, or deprive
them absolutely of a particular right or privilege, but even sym-
bolic badges and incidents of slavery, according to Jones, are
subject to the prohibitions of section 1982." The Greene Court,
however, focused on the strict wording of the statute, i.e., the
same right of all United States citizens to buy, sell, lease or hold
property, rather than on the badges-and-incidents-of-slavery
language of the Civil Rights Cases, a significant departure from
the Jones line of cases.91
Just as it narrowly focused on the wording of section 1982, the
Greene Court also narrowly considered the question for which
certiorari was granted-whether a showing of discriminatory in-
tent is necessary to prove a violation of section 1982. The Court,
ruling on the section 1982 claim, found that the injury here did
not involve the impairment of property interests that have been
schools has a deterimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group." Id.
at 494.
90. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. The Jones Court cited the Civil Rights Cases, see
note 73 supra, for the proposition that "[t]he Thirteenth Amendment authorizes
Congress not only to outlaw all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude but
also to eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half
free .. " 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. The Court asserted the validity of this principle
whatever the current validity of the majority position in the Civil Rights deci-
sion. Id.
91. One commentator has specifically distinguished between the "badges
and incidents of slavery" approach, and the "strict language of section 1982" ap-
proach to this category of race discrimination analysis:
Much will depend on the emphasis the Court will give to the language in
§ 1982 and in Jones. There are several important parts in both which, if
isolated, could result in either narrower or broader interpretations. If the
Court focuses on "badges and incidents of slavery" then the § 1982 inter-
pretation under the Thirteenth Amendment will be quite a powerful
weapon .... The Court . . . could uphold legislation which, while not
dealing with barely minimal rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, is
rationally related to extinguishing a badge or incident of slavery." . . . On
the other hand, the Court could read the statute narrowly and concen-
trate .. .on the same right of all citizens of the United States to enjoy
and own property through inheritance, purchase, leasehold, etc.
Badges and Indices of Slavery, supra note 76, at 102-03.
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identified as being protected by section 1982.92 It arrived at that
conclusion by reasoning that the language of section 1982 con-
cerned the right of black citizens not to have their property in-
terests abridged or impaired because of their race. 3 The Court
viewed disparate treatment based on race as a key element in
showing a violation of the statute.94 Also, in addressing the thir-
teenth amendment claim, the Court noted the absence of any
racially discriminatory intent on the part of the city of Memphis"
and discussed the legitimate interests motivating the city's ac-
tions. Thus, despite Justice White's criticism that the majority
did not address the question for which certiorari was granted,"
the majority did impliedly address the question of discriminatory
purpose. By reviewing the court of appeal's conclusions on dis-
criminatory intent and conducting its own inquiry into the ex-
istence of such intent, the majority has implied that discrim-
inatory intent must be shown to establish a violation of section
1982 and the thirteenth amendment.
The majority saw no discriminatory intent, however, in the
street closing and accepted at face value the interests of
neighborhood tranquility and child safety which were asserted
by the city. Perhaps the Court was looking for an express admis-
sion of racial motivation on the part of the city as occurred in
Jones, Sullivan, and Tillman,9" before it would find such motiva-
tion. It is highly unlikely, however, that such denials of the right
to lease, purchase, or hold property will be so blatantly admitted
now or in the future.9 If residential tranquility and the safety of
92. 101 S. Ct. at 1598.
93. Id at 1597.
94. Id. at 1598.
95. Id. at 1599. The Court stated: "We begin our examination of
respondents' Thirteenth Amendment argument by reiterating the conclusion
that the record discloses no racially discriminatory motive on the part of the City
Council." Id. (footnote omitted).
96. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
97. 101 S. Ct. at 1602 (White, J., concurring).
98. In Jones, the defendant's contention was that section 1982 did not bar
private acts of racial discrimination. 392 U.S. at 412. In Sullivan, 396 U.S. at
236, and Tillman, 410 U.S. at 434, the defendants admitted racial discrimination,
but argued that they were private social clubs, not subject to the provisions of
section 1982.
99. It is indeed probable that, in the future, racially motivated denials of
the right to lease and purchase will become increasingly subtle, thus making
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school children are legitimate local interests, perhaps a city-wide
effort should have been made to promote neighborhood tranquility
and safety of all school children, both black and white, with an
equal allocation of the associated burdens (or inconveniences),
however slight, to black and white citizens."' Perhaps a less
racially suspect alternative should have been pursued. 0' These
are matters which are relevant to the issue of discriminatory in-
tent but to which the Court accorded only cursory treatment.0 2
Perhaps the Court did not address these matters in depth be-
cause of its conclusion that the respondents' injury was not an
impairment of the kind of property interests which are protected
by section 1982.
The court of appeals in Greene noted that the district court, in
finding in favor of the defendants, limited its focus to determining
whether the city of Memphis, in closing West Drive, had granted
a benefit to the white residents of that street that it had refused
to black citizens when they had applied for similar street
closings.'03 The court of appeals observed, however, that the
the burden of proof much more difficult for section 1982 litigants to sustain.
Badges and Indices of Slavery, supra note 76, at 100. Indeed, Justice Stewart's
review, in Jones, of the history of racial discrimination since the Civil War
lends support to this statement. 392 U.S. at 441-43. See note 89 and accompany-
ing text supra, and note that each "substituted" form of discrimination can be
considered more indirect and subtle than its predecessor.
100. The fact that the street closing was not part of a city-wide plan was
noted by the court of appeals. 610 F.2d at 404. It was not addressed by the
Supreme Court majority opinion. However, Justice Marshall, in his dissent,
observed that the trial court testimony of the city officials in charge of street
closings established that this was the only time the city of Memphis has ever
closed a street for traffic control purposes. 101 S. Ct. at 1608 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
101. Some compromise solutions were suggested, such as a low speed limit
and speed breakers. 101 S. Ct. at 1594 n.25.
102. The court of appeals concluded that relief under section 1982 was re-
quired because, among other reasons, the closing of West Drive was not part of
a city-wide plan, but was a unique effort to protect the residents of one
neighborhood from an outside influence which they perceived as uhdesirable.
610 F.2d at 404. In reviewing this finding, the Supreme Court addressed only
that portion dealing with the concept of protection from undesirable outside in-
fluences. 101 S. Ct. at 1593. Furthermore, the Court recognized that some op-
ponents of the resolution based their opposition on the availability of less
drastic solutions to the problem of excess traffic, but it did not examine the
possible alternative solutions, id. at 1594 n.25, nor evaluate their desirability
relative to the racially suspect street closing. Id. at 1594.
103. In support of this contention, the court of appeals quoted the following
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plaintiffs sought relief on a broader basis by invoking the "sen-
sitive inquiry" doctrine. "Sensitive inquiry," as set forth in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.,' 4 is an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
official action, including whether it burdens one race more than
another, and whether a pattern explainable only on racial
grounds results from the official action even though the controlling
legislation is racially neutral.' Additionally, an inquiry may be
made into the legislative or administrative history of the official
act, as well as its general historical background in determining
whether racially discriminatory intent existed.' Applying the
"sensitive inquiry" standard of Arlington Heights to the facts
found by the lower court, the court of appeals found that the
discrimination in Greene was stark and constituted a badge of
slavery.07
passage from the district court's opinion:
[T]he action of the City Council which undertakes to close West Drive did
not create a benefit for white citizens which has been denied black
citizens. The proof shows that this is the only time that the street and
alley closing procedure has been used to close a street which serves as a
thoroughfare for the residents and the public. From the standpoint that
the closing procedure has been used to close alleys and dedicated but
unused streets, the proof shows that the procedure has benefited black
citizens as well as white citizens.
610 F.2d at 398.
104. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Village of Arlington
Heights, in suburban Chicago, refused to re-zone to authorize the construction
of a public housing project inside its boundaries. Metropolitan Housing, along
with other individual minority plaintiffs, filed suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief alleging that the denial was racially motivated and violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 258-59. In ad-
dressing the question of whether the refusal was racially discriminatory and a
violation of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Powell, speaking for the majority
noted that "[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available." Id. at 266.
105. Id.
106. Id at 267-68.
107. 610 F.2d at 402. Specifically, the court of appeals referred to the
district court's finding that the closure of West Drive would have a dispropor-
tionate impact on some black citizens, id at 398, and expert testimony to the ef-
fect that the street closing would be of real benefit to West Drive residents but
have an adverse psychological effect leading to depreciation of property values
in the black neighborhood. Id. at 400.
The court of appeals arrived at a different conclusion of law than the district
court without rejecting any of these findings. Thus, this is not a situation where
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However, the Greene Court insisted that the street closing
cannot fairly be branded as a badge or incident of slavery be-
cause the interests motivating the Memphis City Council were
legitimate local government interests. 8 By clinging to this posi-
tion, the Court not only failed to conduct a "sensitive inquiry" into
all the available evidence of discriminatory intent, but also refused
to draw, from the facts found by the courts below, a reasonable
inference of the operation of such intent in the closing of West
Drive.
The Court had held, in Washington v. Davis, 9 that a racially
disproportionate impact alone does not establish the unconstitu-
tionality of an official act,' and a purpose or intent to dis-
criminate must also be present."' An inference of discriminatory
purpose, however, may be drawn from all the relevant facts, in-
cluding the fact that the official action adversely impacts one
race more than another."2 In Greene it was known at the outset
that the community north of Hein Park was predominantly black,
that the majority of the traffic on West Drive consisted of blacks
travelling to and from that community, and that the inconve-
niences associated with the closing of West Drive would weigh
disproportionately on black citizens." 3 Moreover, the closing plan
the court of appeals departed from the "clearly erroneous" test, the standard of
appellate review of trial court factual findings. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The
court of appeals contradicted the conclusory findings, i.e., the ultimate conclu-
sion, of the district court. The "clearly erroneous" doctrine does not apply to
these ultimate legal conclusions. See United States v. General Motors Corp.,
384 U.S. 127, 141 n.16 (1966); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
44-45 (1960).
108. 101 S. Ct. at 1599-600.
109. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a written test administered to District of Columbia police recruits,
which a large portion of black recruits failed. Id. at 232-35. The Court held that
the racially disproportionate impact alone did not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 246.
110. Id. at 242. See note 9 supra.
111. 426 U.S. at 239.
112. Id at 242. Justice White, writing for the majority in Washington v.
Davis stated: "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be in-
ferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another." Id
113. The majority attempted to minimize the significance of these facts by
saying that "the inconvenience of the drivers is a function of where they live
and where they regularly drive-not a function of their race." 101 S. Ct. at
1600. However, there is a relationship between the race of the drivers and
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called for the northermost portion of West Drive to be deeded to
the white owners of the property abutting West Drive and Jack-
son Avenue, thus giving them the right to bar pedestrian traffic.
The transcripts of testimony before the Memphis City Council
contained evidence that race was a motivating factor in the
initial application to close West Drive."4 Furthermore, the original
application filed by residents of Hein Park in 1979 sought to
close four of five streets leading into the community."5 Thus,
there were sufficient facts surrounding the application to close
West Drive from which an inference of racially discriminatory
purpose could have been drawn without straining the Washing-
ton v. Davis criteria. 116
The Court's refusal to find that the disproportionate burden
imposed on blacks by the street closing constituted a badge or
incident of slavery thus hinged on its unwillingness to find a viola-
tion of section 1982, or to draw a reasonable inference of racial
motivation. 7  Because there is usually only circumstantial
evidence of racial motivation, a plaintiff's success in proving it
depends to a great extent on the fact finder's willingness to
draw an inference of it, which depends on the fact finder's own
biases and feelings about race."8 Greene differed from Jones,
Sullivan, and Tillman only in that in those cases racial
discrimination was essentially admitted and the litigated ques-
where they live, and where they drive: a relationship that was known at the
time the street closing was authorized. Additionally, the majority noted that
Memphis has a long history of racial discrimination and conceded that the
record contains evidence of the existence of racial prejudice in Memphis.
Furthermore, the record also showed that Hein Park was established and main-
tained as an all-white enclave. Id. at 1594 n.27.
114. Id. at 1607 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1588.
116. The Court in Washington v. Davis found that "the discriminatory im-
pact ... may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because
in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on non-
racial grounds." 426 U.S. at 242. Indeed, the failure to make a city-wide effort to
promote neighborhood tranquility and child safety in both black and white com-
munities and the existence of less "racially suspect" alternatives, makes the
alleged discrimination in Greene difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. See
text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
117. 101 S. Ct. at 1601.
118. See Brown, Givelber & Subrin, Treating Blacks as if They Were
White: Problems of Definition and Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 12-13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Givelber & Subrin].
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tion was whether section 1982 applied to private acts of discrimi-
nation."9 Because it is now established that section 1982 pro-
hibits both private and official acts of discrimination, there re-
mains the problem of what constitutes sufficient circumstantial
evidence of racial discrimination to allow an inference of it to be
drawn. The criteria which were established by Washington v.
Davis, arguably met in the Greene case, were not considered by
the majority.20
The factual situation in City of Memphis v. Greene posed no
major new civil rights ground to be broken. It is not a case of
first impression. The case is, as Justice Marshall stated in the
beginning of his dissent, "easier than the majority makes it ap-
pear.""12 The closing of West Drive in Memphis, Tennessee, was
not as blatant a form of racial discrimination as an outright re-
fusal to sell or rent property to blacks, a restrictive covenant
among adjacent white property owners not to sell to blacks, or a
denial to blacks of privileges or benefits given to white property
owners. It was a more subtle and sophisticated method of dis-
crimination cloaked by the emotionally charged notions of pre-
serving neighborhood tranquility and assuring the safety of
school children.'2
The Greene Court, with its narrow reading of section 1982,
failed to recognize a badge of slavery in terms of its symbolic
significance rather than the magnitude of its effect. Its focus on
the economic harm, rather than the symbolic significance of an
infringement of the rights enumerated in the statute, disregards
the public policy that a broad construction of the statute serves-
desegregation of the real estate and the housing markets.' 23 The
majority also failed to apply the Washington v. Davis criteria for
determining racially discriminatory purpose in a factual setting
in which such an application was appropriate.
The decision in City of Memphis v. Greene hampers the pro-
gress made in the Jones-Sullivan line of decisions, which expanded
119. See 410 U.S. at 434; 396 U.S. at 236; 392 U.S. at 412-13.
120. The majority cited Washington v. Davis merely for the proposition
that "absence of proof of discriminatory intent forecloses any claim that the of-
ficial action challenged ... violates the Equal Protection Clause ...." 101 S. Ct.
at 1596.
121. Id at 1604 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 1588.
123. See Brown, Givelber & Subrin, supra note 118, at 11.
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the freedoms protected under section 1982 and the thirteenth
amendment. It may open the door to further subtle methods of
discrimination in housing, cloaked in the guise of an assertion of
local interest.
Nicholas D. Krawec
